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Abstract: This paper utilizes a new critical junctures framework to help understand the nature of the changes in macro-
economic policy. The framework consists of three elements which must be identified in sequence to be able to declare, 
with some certainty, if an event was a critical juncture. These are crisis, ideational change, and radical policy change. Util-
izing the critical juncture framework, we will determine whether changes to Mexican and Swedish macroeconomic policy 
in the early 1980s constituted clean breaks with the past, or were continuations of previously established policy pathways, 
and why that was. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 We employ the critical juncture framework developed by 
Hogan and Doyle [1]. According to this, a critical juncture 
consists of crisis, ideational change, and radical policy 
change (see Fig. 1). The framework rests upon the hypothe-
sis that a crisis induced consolidation of a new idea – replac-
ing an extant idea – can lead to significant policy change. 
The framework can explain why certain crises lead to critical 
junctures in policies whereas others do not, as the differenti-
ating factor between them was ideational change. The 
framework contests that in the absence of ideational change 
the level of policy change, in response to a crisis, can be of 
the first or second order, but not the third.1 Policy instrument 
settings, and the instruments themselves, may change, but 
without ideational change the hierarchy of goals underpin-
ning a policy will remain unaltered. Ideational change is the 
intermediating variable between a crisis and the subsequent 
nature of policy change in response to that crisis. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. (1). Critical juncture approach. 
 
 This framework has been used to examine changes in 
macroeconomic policy in America, Britain, and Ireland, and 
privatisation policy in Brazil and Argentina. In this case, the 
macroeconomic difficulties affecting both Mexico and Swe-
den at the start of the 1980s will be examined to see if they  
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1Here the model borrows from Hall’s (1993) concept of first, second and third order 
change. 
constituted crises, and, if so, did these crises lead to changes 
in the ideas underpinning macroeconomic policy, and the 
subsequent nature of the change in Mexican and Swedish 
macroeconomic policy. Were the macroeconomic policies in 
Mexico and Sweden in the early 1980s a continuation of, or 
break with, the past? 
THE CHARACTERISTICS AND USES OF THE 
CRITICAL JUNCTURES APPROACH 
 Critical junctures are seen as branching point that set 
processes of institutional, or policy change, in motion. A 
critical juncture occurs when a new institution/policy is cre-
ated, or when an extant institution/policy changes com-
pletely. The literature sees critical junctures resulting in the 
adoption of an institutional arrangement from among alterna-
tives [2]. Thereafter, the pathway established funnels units in 
a particular direction [3, 4]. 
 For some, a critical juncture constitutes a brief period in 
which one direction or another is taken, while for others, it is 
an extended period of reorientation [5]. The concept has 
been employed in comparative politics. Critical juncture 
frameworks have been used in the analyses of Latin America 
[5, 6]. For them critical junctures took decades to occur. In 
relation to short term change, Garrett and Lange [7: p. 628] 
showed that electoral landslides created critical junctures by 
producing mandates for policy change. Casper and Taylor 
[8] employed the concept in analysing liberalisation of 
authoritarian regimes, while Hogan’s [9, 10] remoulded 
framework was used to examine change in trade union influ-
ence over public policy. Karl [11] employed the concept in 
analyzing how “petro-states” became locked into problem-
atic development pathways, while Flockhart [12] used criti-
cal junctures to explain the gap between the Danish popula-
tion and their political elites’ attitudes towards the European 
Union. 
 Critical junctures highlight the importance of the past in 
explaining the present. 
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THE COUNTRIES SELECTED FOR EXAMINATION 
 Mexico and Sweden were selected for examination based 
upon most similar and most different criteria. For most simi-
lar we chose the criteria of having long-standing democra-
cies and advanced capitalist states. They are most different 
according to Lijphart’s [13] categories of majoritarian and 
consensual democracies, allowing us to control for varying 
institutional arrangements. Both countries’ economies were 
very different, while their performances, and the policies 
governing them, have varied dramatically. Their geographic 
locations also provide for a global encompassing contrast. 
Thus, their similarities ensure “the contexts of analysis are 
analytically equivalent to a significant degree,” while their 
differences place “parallel processes of change in sharp re-
lief” [14: p. 2].  
POLICY CHANGE AND ITS IDENTIFICATION  
 Policy change is complex, and must be seen in the con-
text of societal and political change [15]. Utilizing Hogan 
and Doyle’s [1] framework, we examine change in Mexican 
and Swedish macroeconomic policy in the early 1980s in 
discrete stages. The first stage examines the economy to see 
if it was in crisis. A crisis implies that prevailing policy can-
not be sustained without deterioration [16]. An economic 
crisis, therefore, can influence policy preferences [17]. To 
test for an economic crisis we develop observable implica-
tions.  
 The framework’s second stage tests for ideational 
change. New ideas can change the policy environment [18]. 
But, how ideas influence policy is something theorists have 
long grappled with [19]. This gives rise to questions: where 
do ideas come from? How do they relate to failing policies? 
And, why do the ideas underlying a failing policy sometimes 
change, resulting in policy change, whereas at other times 
they remains unaltered, resulting in policy continuation? To 
answer this, a second set of observables, based on Legro 
[20], are set out. 
 The framework’s third stage tests for policy change. Here 
our observables are based upon the work of Hall [21], tying 
together the concepts of policy change, societal learning, and 
the state. Thus, each stage employs observable implications 
incorporating aspects of societal and political change. 
Testing for a Macroeconomic Crisis 
 Scholars regularly ‘agree that severe recessions make 
significant structural changes possible as they render politics 
highly fluid’ [22: p. 522]. However, economic crises are 
rare, rendering definition and identification difficult [23: p. 
439]. How do we identify a crisis? Stone [24: p. 299] argues 
that a situation does not become a problem until it is control-
lable. But, if something is controllable it must be measur-
able, otherwise how would we know if we are controlling it? 
Thus, even economic crises must be quantifiable. 
 Kaminsky, et al., [25] and Berg and Pattillo [26] advo-
cated examining individual variables when quantifying cur-
rency crises. Pei and Adesnik [27: pp. 138-139] developed a 
broader range of criteria for identifying macroeconomic cri-
ses: annual inflation greater than 15 percent, stagnant annual 
gross domestic product (GDP), and historians and other ana-
lysts’ descriptions of significant deterioration in economic 
circumstances. Frankle and Rose [28: p. 351] define a “mac-
roeconomic crisis” as a stagnant economy, where investment 
is in decline, inflation, interest rates, and unemployment are 
above 15 percent, and various actors perceive the economy 
to be in crisis. For Garuba [29: p. 21], Kwon [30: p. 105], 
and Solimano [31: p. 76] a macroeconomic crisis can be 
identified through general indicators and perceptions of 
growth, inflation, employment creation, and poverty. 
 We seek to identify macroeconomic crises through quan-
titative and qualitative measures. Defining anything as a cri-
sis, including a macroeconomic downturn, requires subjec-
tive and objective deliberations [27: p. 39]. Consequently, 
González [32: p. 93] suggests adopting a multifaceted ap-
proach. Agents must diagnose, and impose on others, their 
notion of a crisis before collective action to resolve uncer-
tainty can take meaningful form [33: p. 9]. This fits with 
Hay’s [34: p. 321] perception of a crisis as the triumph of a 
simplifying ideology.  
 Thus, we develop a range of observable implications, 
which build upon previous studies [1]. They seek to identify 
change in nominal economic performance as well as in per-
ceptions of economic health.  
O1. If GDP growth was stagnant/negative, the economy 
may have been in crisis. 
O2. If total debt as a percentage of GNI was above 100 
percent, the economy may have been in crisis. 
O3. If inflation was above 15 percent [27], the economy 
may have been in crisis. 
O4. If the interest rate was above 15 percent, the economy 
may have been in crisis. 
O5. If the unemployment rate was above 15 percent, the 
economy may have been in crisis. 
O6. If opinion polls find the public regarded the economic 
in crisis, then the economy may have been in crisis. 
O7. If the national media regarded the economy in crisis, 
then the economy may have been in crisis. 
O8. If economic and political commentators regarded the 
economy in crisis, then the economy may have been 
in crisis. 
O9. If the central bank regarded the economy in crisis, 
then the economy may have been in crisis. 
O10. If both domestic and international organisations 
monitoring economic performance regarded the 
economy in crisis, then the economy may have been 
in crisis. 
O11. If elected representatives regarded the economy in 
crisis, then the economy may have been in crisis. 
O12. If government pronouncements on the economy were 
consistent with a crisis management approach, then 
the economy may have been in crisis. 
Mexico – Potential Crisis 1981-1983 
 After the Second World War Mexico sought growth 
through import substitution [35]. Domestic industries were 
developed behind import quotas [36, 37]. This increased the 
country’s international trade, while decreasing its foreign 
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dependence. However, Hernandez [38] pointed out competi-
tiveness was not crucial for Mexican businesses, as the inter-
nal market was closed to foreign competition. Nevertheless, 
the model succeeded as there was a strong demand for Mexi-
can raw materials. Hernandez [38] argued that Mexico’s 
policies created a private sector with a mercantile mentality, 
that came to depend upon state protection.  
 Under President Echeverria’s (1970-1976) poor decisions 
drove the economy into recession [35]. Serra-Puche [39] 
remarked that the Echeverria administration permitted fiscal 
and monetary discipline to collapse. This marked the exhaus-
tion of the policy know as “stabilising development”. Mex-
ico’s import substitution could not compete with global 
manufacturers such as Japan. Rubio [40] put the failures of 
stabilising development down to falling agricultural exports, 
rapid population growth, and a middle class disillusioned 
with its inability to express itself in a one party (Institutional 
Revolutionary Party (PRI)) dominated culture.  
 President Portillo (1976-1982) inherited a troubled econ-
omy [41]. However, huge oil reserves were discovered by 
Petróleos Mexicanos (PEMEX), the state oil company, in the 
late 1970s [42]. The hope was that oil revenues would stabi-
lise the economy. Interviewees pointed out that this discov-
ery permitted extant policies to soldier on. However, the oil 
boom only circumvented the dangers of immediate crisis, 
without resolving the structural problems in the economy 
[43]. Tournaud [44] argued this was evidence of the tempo-
rary solutions often sought by the Mexican political elite. 
Tournaud [44] blamed this short-termism on the institutional 
structure that permitted presidents only one term of office. 
 Once the country had become a net petroleum exporter 
pressure grew to expand public spending. Mexico’s devel-
opment strategy came to depend upon oil revenues. The 
number of state owned enterprises quadrupled to 1,200 [42, 
45]. Expenditure came to outstrip revenues derived from 
petroleum and an anaemic taxation system [46]. To finance 
these projects Mexico had borrowed $78bn. by 1981 [41]. 
 This expenditure began to overheat the economy by the 
late 1970s (Appendix A). By this time the state’s share of 
fixed capital formation had increased to 50 percent [47: p. 
277]. As inflation rose above 25 percent the peso became 
overvalued, and the competiveness of exports, apart from oil, 
diminished [48]. ‘The merchandise trade balance deterio-
rated’ as ‘imports rose while nonoil exports earning stag-
nated’ [49: p. 494].  
 Mexico was poorly positioned to resist the financial chal-
lenges of the early 1980s as oil prices fell in response to a 
weakening world economy and a supply glut [50]. To com-
pound matters, PEMEX and the Secretaría de Programación 
y Presupuesto (SPP), published a report clarifying that oil 
production would not be sufficient to reactivate the economy 
[51]. Problems in the US meant that as interest rate increased 
there, the money supply diminished. As Starr [52: p. 53] puts 
it ‘collapsing oil prices and rising international interest rates 
erased Mexico’s economic prosperity’. The result was that 
foreign borrowing became a requirement to sustain expan-
sion. 
 Higher US unemployment lowered demand for Mexican 
goods. The sharp increase in US interest rates placed increas-
ing pressure on Mexico’s debt servicing, as US banks had 
lent the country some $25 billion. Servicing Mexico’s total 
debt reached $16 billion, more than the country’s revenues 
from oil [53: p. 89].  
 By 1982, as confidence in the economy waned, Mexicans 
began converting pesos into dollars at up to 25 billion pesos 
a day [54]. To reduce the flow of capital out of the economy 
Banco de Mexico permitted the dollar price of the peso to 
double. However, the gravity of the situation came to inter-
national attention on August 13, 1982, when:  
 The government fired the shot heard around the world, 
announcing that it could not meet interest payments coming 
due within the next few days and initiating negotiations for 
bridge loans and rescheduling agreements with the US 
Treasury, the IMF, and the private commercial banks [43: p. 
97].  
 Mexico’s main economic indicators pointed towards a 
crisis (Appendix A) [55]. GDP contracted by 0.6 percent in 
1982 and a staggering 4.2 percent in 1983, while the rate of 
inflation reached 58.92 percent in 1982 [56]. Unemployment 
jumped towards 15 percent [57], while more than 20 million 
people, more than half the workforce, were underemployed 
[53: p. 92]. Output fell in all industries, mineral production 
declined by 10 percent, auto production 20 percent, and agri-
culture 20 percent [57]. To compound matters US banks 
stopped lending to Mexican companies as they already owed 
over US$600 million in interest [58]. The budget deficit 
stood at a staggering 16.5 percent of GDP [57].  
 In 1983 inflation reached triple digits, the national debt 
and unemployment continued to rise, and the level of capital 
formation slackened (Appendix A). Time Magazine pointed 
to the dramatic devaluation of the peso against the dollar 
[59]. According to Edwards [60: p. 17] this was the worst 
crisis to hit Mexico since the Great Depression. The Third 
World Magazine [61], Gestión y Estrategia [62], and Time 
Magazine [63] referred to Mexico’s economic difficulties as 
a crisis. The Economist regarded Mexico as the country most 
affected by the crises of the 1980s [64]. Spanish newspaper 
El País, stressed that Mexico’s crisis was partly due to the 
policies of President Portillo [65]. Mexican economic maga-
zine Proceso regarded the 1982 crisis as Mexico’s worst 
recession [66].  
 Confidence in Mexico’s economy, and politicians, 
evaporated. Hernandez [38] stated that the situation left the 
country without financial security. The Third World Maga-
zine argued the country was effectively bankrupt [67]. Wil-
liam Perry of Georgetown University observed that the crisis 
was a sign that Mexico’s traditional political system was 
decaying [57]. Minimum wages were insufficient to meet the 
basic needs of most Mexican families. Prices for staples in-
creased at least 400 percent at the beginnings of 1982, while 
wages increased by just 300 percent [68]. Opinion polls 
found great scepticism concerning the economy [69]. The 
decision to nationalise the banks, to decrease foreign inves-
tors’ panic, and the continued speculation against the peso, 
was a last desperate measure by President Portillo [70].  
 During 1982 the peso was devaluated twice [71]. The 
hope was that devaluation might increase exports, but the 
economy could not hold onto a sufficient amount of dollars 
[72]. New short term loans were taken in an effort to coun-
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teract the capital flight, but, together with the peso’s de-
valuation, this did nothing [73]. Banco de Mexico’s reserves 
dried up in a matter of weeks [74]. In his Sixth Annual 
Presidential Report, Portillo stated that the economy was 
going through the worst crisis in its history [75]. 
 Sandersen [76] points to three issues that exacerbated 
Mexico’s problems: (i) economic policy was directed by a 
coalition of political leaders; (ii) stability of the PRI was 
threatened by opposition parties; (iii) economic demands of 
oil-rich Mexico could no longer be sustained by the policy 
framework. Furthermore, Bailey [77: p. 54] identified four 
trends that produced the economic panic: oil price 
fall/excessive government outlays; $15.3 billion in short-
term loans which funded capital flight; overvalued peso; and 
high dollarization. 
 Under Portillo GDP grew at 8 percent annually from 
1978 to 1981, one of the highest levels in the world. How-
ever, by the beginning of 1982, Mexico had run up a huge 
national debt, and drastically devalued its currency. By the 
end of 1982, Mexico faced one of the severest  
macroeconomic crises in its history [78, 79]. 
Sweden – Potential Crisis 1981-1983 
 The recession that began in the mid-1970s, as a result of 
the first oil shock, proved persistent. Central government’s 
expenditures grew at a faster pace by the end of the 1970s 
than they had at the beginning of that decade, while revenues 
stagnated due to slow economic growth. The consequential 
budget deficits were largely financed through borrowing 
from abroad. However, there was no political mandate for 
either radical budget cuts or revenue enhancements. The 
non-socialists parties in government (Centre, Liberals and 
Moderates) wanted neither to raise the level of taxes nor be 
accused of trying to dismantle the social welfare state they 
had only recently taken power over, after decades out in the 
cold [80]. 
 By 1982 the Swedish economy was in difficulty, with the 
media, national commentators, domestic and international 
organisations, and the central bank, all pointing this out. 
With a sluggish national economy, stagnant revenues, and 
rapidly rising expenditure, the government’s budget deficits 
accelerated during the late 1970s, so that by 1982 they had 
reached a very worrying 13 percent of GNP [81: p. 17]. The 
Riksbank predicted that ‘the deficit on the national budget, 
which the non-Socialist Government had struggled to con-
tain over the pervious two years, would grow from around 
SKr78 billion under the 1982-83 budget to some SKr90 bil-
lion in 1983-1984’ [82: p. 32]. ‘In an international context, 
both the level of the budget deficit, and the swing in the 
budget balance since the mid-1970s has been more pro-
nounced than in most other OECD countries’ [83: p. 16]. By 
1982 Sweden’s ratio of debt of GNP stood at 59.3 percent. 
An indication of just how substantial the budget deficits 
were can be ascertained from the fact that the debt to GNP 
ratio had stood at 50.8 percent just 12 months before. In all, 
the Swedish debt to GNP ratio had grown by over 250  
percent in the space of just six years! The Economist [84: p. 
41] observed that inflation was running at 8.6 percent in 
1982, although significantly down on 1981’s rate of 12.1  
percent, this figure was still very high for Sweden. Unem- 
ployment, having hovered at between 1.5 and 2 percent  
throughout the 1970s, had reach 3.1 percent in 1982, its  
highest level since 1945. Although this would have been a  
miniscule figure anywhere else, it was a political scandal in a  
country accustomed to full employment [85: p. 3]. For  
Swedes this was an unprecedented situation.  
 However, some economists believed that the [unem-
ployment] figure would have been closer to 16 percent if it 
included the jobless who are in training programmes and 
public work projects, workers who have been forced into 
early retirement, and Swedes who have given up looking for 
work [80: p. 32]. 
 Yet, apart from unemployment, and the debt to GNP ra-
tio, none of the other indicators set out in Appendix B were 
at decade-long lows. Economic growth, which had averaged 
2.5 percent throughout the fluctuation economic conditions 
of the 1970s, stood at a mere 1 percent in 1982, after in fact 
contracting the previous year. Although only 2,000 days 
were lost to industrial disputes in 1982, 209,000 had been 
lost in 1981, while 4,478,000 days were lost in 1980 [86]. 
Nevertheless, in the context of the international recession of 
the early 1980s, the large budget deficit prevented the gov-
ernment from pursuing a counter-cyclical fiscal policy. Con-
sequently, Sweden had to accept the impact of recession 
from abroad. 
 The Washington Post pointed out that at this time the 
Swedish economy faced serious economic challenges [87: p. 
A15]. ‘The country, like most in Europe, now suffers from 
low growth, falling industrial output and an unfavourable 
trade balance’ observed the New York Times [88: p. 17]. The 
paper went on to argue that the Swedish economy, once the 
envy of Europe, had been hobbled by its foreign debt, a low 
rate of investment, an adverse balance of payments, and its 
level of unemployment [85: p. 3]. The Financial Times 
pointed out that Swedes were nervous about the future, and 
reluctant to see their welfare state cut back and to accept the 
tough remedies proposed to deal with their growing eco-
nomic problems [89: p. 15]. “The welfare state is in a major 
crisis of legitimacy,’ observed Hans Vetterberg, Sweden’s 
leading pollster and public opinion analyst. ‘We can no 
longer afford to keep expanding it the way we were” [87: p. 
A15].  
 The OECD [83: p. 49] described the situation in the 
Swedish economy in the spring of 1982 as difficult. Eco-
nomic performance in the two years to mid-1982 had been 
poor, this partly influenced by the weak international envi-
ronment. Furthermore, in spite of the adjustment policies 
pursued by the authorities, correction of the large imbalances 
that had built up since the early 1970s was slow, and the 
economy remained in a situation of marked disequilibrium 
[90: p. 7]. Apart from maintaining a relatively good level of 
employment the government’s economic policies were not 
successful. The government’s budgetary position weakened 
sharply, with the growth in public expenditures greatly out-
stripping that of the overall economy [90: p. 9]. The OECD 
[90: p. 12] further pointed out that foreign competition had 
made substantial inroads on the Swedish domestic market, as 
suggested by the steady rise in the imported share of manu-
factured goods used domestically.  
 Ironically, the public sector’s share of GNP had risen 
rapidly under the non-socialists, so that by 1982 public sec-
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tor expenditure constituted some 67 percent of GNP [91: p. 
59]. That level of spending explained in part how the number 
of jobs in the public sector could rise by 43 percent between 
1972 and 1982, coming to outnumber jobs in private industry 
after 1978 [92: p. 123]. Worryingly, Peterson [93: p. 33] 
points out that Sweden’s share of the world economy 
dropped by some 40 percent during the same ten-year period. 
Labours’ productivity growth from about 1970 onwards was 
markedly less impressive than prior to then. The sluggish 
aggregate productivity growth in Sweden after 1970 was to 
some extent the result of the large size of the public sector, 
and labours’ slow productivity growth [94: p. 1312]. Thus, 
by the 1980s, the Swedish economy, once the envy of 
Europe, had been hobbled by crisis [85]. 
 From Table 1 it is clear that the Mexican economy was in 
crisis during the early 1980s, with all observable implica-
tions satisfied by our findings. It is also clear from Table 1 
that Sweden, although it did not satisfy all observable impli-
cations, satisfied most - three-quarters. This information, 
combined with the fact that the economic conditions existing 
in Sweden at this time were totally out of context for that 
society, and that there was much hidden unemployment, 
leads us to declare that it too was in economic crisis in 1982. 
The next section examines both countries for changes in the 
ideas underlying macroeconomic policy at this time. 
Table 1. The Identification of Macroeconomic Crisis 
The Observable Implications Mex Sw 
O1. Was GDP growth stagnant. X X 
O2. Was total debt above 100% of GNI? X  
O3. Was inflation above 15%? X  
O4. Was interest rate above 15%? X X 
O5. Was unemployment above 15%? X  
O6. Opinion polls- economy in crisis? X X 
O7. Media - economy in crisis? X X 
O8. Econ/pol commentators - economy in crisis? X X 
O9. Central bank - economy in crisis? X X 
O10. Dom/ int orgs - economy in crisis? X X 
O11. Reps - economy in crisis? X X 
O12. Gov - crisis management approach? X X 
Economic Crisis  Y Y 
 
Testing for Ideational Change 
 Previous policies can be discredited due to their implica-
tion in, or inability to right, a crisis [95]. Although economic 
crises can have great impact they will not determine policy, 
whose formulation is ‘centred in domestic political and idea-
tional processes’ [96: p. 375]. Hogan and Doyle’s [1] 
framework contends that significant policy change depends 
upon actors reaching consensus upon, and subsequently con-
solidating around, a particular set of new ideas. This corre-
sponds to McNamara’s [96: pp. 4-5] argument that actors 
utilize new ideas to chart policy strategy. ‘Ideas facilitate the 
reduction of … barriers by acting as coalition-building re-
sources among agents who attempt to resolve the crisis’ [33: 
p. 37]. Ideas are the casual mechanisms of change in any 
critical juncture [97]. Thus, ideational change stands between 
a crisis and policy change, determining if a crisis will result 
in policy change.  
 Hogan and Doyle’s [1] framework contents that new 
ideas are introduced by three groups of change agents. Com-
binations of these agents constitute a policy network [21]. 
The most important are what Dahl [98] termed ‘political 
entrepreneurs’. Political entrepreneurs ‘exploit moments of 
instability’ and ‘invest resources in the creation of a new 
policy, a new agency, or new forms of collective action’ [99: 
pp. 188-190]. In a crisis, a political leader, usually an opposi-
tion leader, will seek out new ideas to rectify the ills of the 
existing policy paradigm. The second group are Kingdon’s 
[100: pp. 179-183] ‘policy entrepreneurs’. These are agents 
who spread ideas to replace the current paradigm. They may 
be civil servants, technocrats, academics, economists and 
interest groups. The final group of change agents consists of 
outside influences: the media, the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD), the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. They critique an 
existing economic paradigm, advocating a new one. Both 
policy entrepreneurs and outside influences are responsible 
for producing ideas, but, political entrepreneurs introduce 
ideas into the policy process. 
 According to Legro’s [20: p. 419] two-stage model of 
ideational change, if agents agree the existing ideational 
paradigm is deficient and should be replaced, the first stage – 
ideational collapse – has occurred. These are the observables 
for ideational collapse: 
Ideational Collapse 
O1. The media questions the efficacy of the current 
model/specific policy areas.  
O2. Opposition political parties critique the current model 
and propose alternative ideas – at election time their 
platform will be built around these alternatives. 
O3. Civil society organizations, e.g. labour unions, em-
ployer organizations, consumer groups etc. critique 
the current model, reflecting Hall’s [21: p. 12] coali-
tion-centred approach. 
O4. Widespread public dissatisfaction with the current 
paradigm, observable through opinion polls, protests 
etc. 
O5. External/international organizations critique the cur-
rent model and/or actively disseminate alternative 
ideas. 
 Agents will then propose a range of solutions, with one 
main challenger to the dominant creed. However, ‘even 
when ideational collapse occurs, failure to reach consensus 
on a replacement could still produce continuity, as society 
reflexively re-embraces the old orthodoxy’ [20: p. 424]. The 
crucial issue is reaching consensus on a new set of ideas. If 
consensus is achieved it marks the second stage of Legro’s 
model – consolidation – agents coordinating a replacement 
set of ideas. This can be seen in political entrepreneurs con-
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solidating innovations by combining a mixture of interests to 
produce a winning coalition [99: pp. 192-193]. Oliver and 
Pemberton [101] identified this process as policy learning. 
Below are the observables for new ideational consolidation. 
New Ideational Consolidation 
O6. A clear set of alternative ideas, developed by policy 
entrepreneurs, are evident. 
O7. A clear change agent (political entrepreneur) inject-
ing new ideas into the policy arena is evident. 
O8. The political entrepreneur combines a mixture of 
interests to produce consensus around a replacement para-
digm. 
 Policies are protected by underlying ideas [102]. The 
greater the consensus encompassing an idea the more pro-
tected the policies derived from it. Protected policies repre-
sent continuity, whereby once a policy has become institu-
tionally embedded, ‘policy-making becomes possible only in 
terms of these ideas’ [103: p. 4]. Referring to policies as pro-
tected is similar to Golob’s notion of ‘policy frontiers’ [97: 
363]. 
The Ideas Underlying Mexican Macroeconomic Policy 
 Populist-redistributive models were implemented by PRI 
presidents between 1934 and 1976 [76: p. 319]. When Porti-
llo came to office he was forced to contemplate reduced ex-
penditure due to the economic downturn in the wake of the 
oil crisis [103]. However, the discovery of vast oil reserves 
changed everything, with Portillo adopting a patronage 
model. This embraced trade expansion and liberalisation, 
rapid industrialisation and expansive state expenditure [77]. 
Portillo’s continuation of the populist approach produced 
high growth, however, the economy remained vulnerable. 
 Rather than pay the political price that sweeping redis-
tributive policies-especially tax reform-would have entailed, 
both the Echeverria administration (1970-1976) and the 
Portillo administration (1976-1982) sought to expand the 
entire economic pie and increase the role of the state in the 
economy, as banker, entrepreneur, and employer [53: p. 88]. 
 Despite oil revenues, the economy became fuelled on 
foreign borrowing and declining real wages [104]. However, 
once oil prices fell, and interest rates spiked, Mexico faced 
the prospect of debt default. The ideas underlying extant 
economic policy underwent a rethink. By mid March 1982, 
President Portillo’s administration introduced a 12 point plan 
to stabilise the economy [105]. 
 During the 1982 presidential election all contenders fo-
cused on the crisis. Miguel De La Madrid, a fiscal conserva-
tive, was selected as PRI presidential candidate in September 
1981 [106]. He was ‘among the leaders of the conservative 
faction based in the treasury’ [43: p. 98]. The mechanics of 
this selection process were hidden [76: p. 320], but it appears 
that shifts in a more conservative direction within inner cir-
cles of the PRI led to the choice of De La Madrid [107]. 
Mexican society was in turmoil, and free market supporters 
wanted a president who would support the rights of private 
property [108]. In an interview Cárdenas [109] remarked that 
the choice of De La Madrid marked a rupture within the PRI 
from its revolutionary ideology. There was a feeling that the 
PRI, and traditional politics, was failing to meet the chal-
lenges confronting Mexican society. 
 During his campaign, De La Madrid stressed the differ-
ences between his proposed government and that of Portillo. 
“Crises come about because the government tries to consoli-
date all interests at the same time...” declared De La Madrid 
[110: pp. 1-2]. His proposed government would mobilise 
resources to change the direction of the economy [110]. ‘In 
the post-1982 environment, policy options and instruments 
appeared limited [for Mexico], which as a debtor was subject 
to the conditionality imposed by the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF)’ [97: p. 375].  
 In his inauguration address De La Madrid declared oppo-
sition to populism and institutional corruption [53: p. 93]. He 
stated that a new moral, political and economic approach 
was needed [111]. Locked into a harsh IMF bailout, negoti-
ated by the outgoing administration [112], De La Madrid 
presented a detailed programme for policy change [113]. 
 In his new approach to managing the economy, De La 
Madrid, acting as a political entrepreneur, kept Silva-Herzog 
in the treasury, and Miguel Mancera Aguayo in the Central 
Bank [57], while selecting 11 new ministers from the con-
servative wing of the PRI [43: p. 95]. His aim was to take 
policy to the right. In this regard, his cabinet broadly sup-
ported his measures to stabile and open the economy [114, 
115: p. 28]. In Mexico access to the president was the only 
means of influencing policy; thus policy entrepreneurs culti-
vated teams of loyal followers within various bureaucracies 
[97: p. 383]. 
 The De La Madrid administration had a limited range of 
policy options. As Hernandez [38] stated, sources of external 
finance dried up in the aftermath of the crisis, while oil reve-
nues remained stagnant. Even when oil prices rose, the 
Mexican oil industry did not have the capacity take advan-
tage of this. Macroeconomic stabilisation became the priority 
[116: p. 421]. These decisions were applied across all gov-
ernment policies [53: p. 107]. To maintain economic, politi-
cal, and social order, a break with the past was required. The 
De La Madrid administration gave priority to greater integra-
tion into the world economy by attracting foreign direct in-
vestment (FDI); and focusing on high tech industries.  
The Ideas Underlying Swedish Macroeconomic Policy 
 In the spring of 1981 the non-socialist coalitions gov-
ernment and the opposition Social Democrats Socialdemok-
ratiska Arbetarepartiet (SAP) reached agreement on ways of 
reducing marginal taxation. However, this agreement led to a 
dispute within the coalition that saw the Moderates resign 
from the government. Prime Minister Thorbjorn Fälldin 
formed a new minority Government of the two middle par-
ties (Centre and Liberal), his third Cabinet in five years. 
Both of these parties had suffered losses in the general elec-
tion of 1979, and between them held a total of only 102 of 
the 350 seats in the Riksdag [117]. This minority government 
hoped that its active program to combat Sweden’s economic 
problems would generate respect for non-socialist policies. 
However, declining popularity figures plagued the new ad-
ministration [84]. A mounting central government budget 
deficit, a negative balance of payments, and rising unem-
ployment figures showed that the economic crisis was a real-
ity [86: p. 7]. Swollen social welfare expenditures only 
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added to the crisis. The welfare state was becoming dysfunc-
tional for capital [118: p. 81). In the autumn of 1981 Sweden 
carried out a 10 percent devaluation of the krona, and in the 
spring of 1982 the non-socialist government introduced a 
far-reaching austerity program. However, the opposition 
Social Democrats gained ground while the two governing 
parties noted the steady erosion of their popularity in the 
opinion polls [119: pp. 129-130]. 
 The 1982 election was deemed crucial as it would deter-
mine whether public support had shifted, as in Norway and 
Denmark, away from the Social Democrats. The election 
campaign was dominated by talk of economic crisis – a $10 
billion debt to foreign banks, inflation, declining exports, 
and increasing unemployment [87]. During the campaign the 
Social Democrats under Olof Plame attacked the viability of 
another non-socialist government, and their economic poli-
cies. The party presented a program on how Sweden could 
save and work its way out of crisis. Ultimately, the election, 
and the debates surrounding it, failed to generate either a 
coherent set of alternative economic ideas to replace the ex-
isting ones, or a significant agent of change. The non-
socialist parties failed to create a coalition of interests around 
ideas alternative to those of the welfare state. Nearly all eco-
nomic ideas presented were variations on existing themes. 
Despite the dominant orthodoxy’s failure society reflexively 
re-embraced it as there was no political entrepreneur cham-
pioning any viable alternatives developed by policy entre-
preneurs. The ideas underpinning the policies of the welfare 
state endured. The SAP won the election, not on the back of 
a new economic paradigm that could cure the country’s 
woes, but, on a series of proposals to correct existing eco-
nomic arrangements. 
Table 2. The Identification of Ideational Change  
The Observable Implications Mex Sw 
Ideational Collapse    
O1. Media questioning efficacy of current model X X 
O2. Opposition parties critique current model. X  
O3. Civil society organisations critique the current 
model  
X  
O4. Widespread public dissatisfaction with current 
paradigm 
X X 
O5. Ext/int organisations critique current model X X 
 Y Y 
New Ideational Consolidation   
O6. A clear set of alternative ideas are evident X  
O7. A clear change agent X  
O8. Political entrepreneur combines interests to pro-
duce consensus 
X  
Adoption of New Idea Y N 
 
 From Table 2 it is clear In the case of Mexico ideational 
change followed macroeconomic crisis. The ideas underpin-
ning macroeconomic policy, focused on import substitution 
industrialisation, collapsed. Vast expenditure, based upon the 
belief that oil revenues could support rapid industrialisation, 
led the country to the brink of bankruptcy. De La Madrid, 
acting as a political entrepreneur, implemented a new set of 
ideas on how to manage the economy. These involved mov-
ing the economy away from import substitution, towards a 
more open approach to international trade.  
 At this time Sweden was also experiencing unfulfilled 
economic expectations, and change agents there were dissat-
isfied with the prevailing economic paradigm. This consti-
tuted extant ideational collapse. However, unlike in Mexico, 
although extant ideas on how to manage the economy had 
collapsed, in the wake of the economic crisis, change agents 
in Sweden failed to consolidate around a replacement eco-
nomic orthodoxy. One of the reasons for this failure was that 
no political entrepreneur came forward to champion an alter-
native set of ideas to those underlying social democracy. The 
result was that a new set of ideas on how to manage the 
Swedish economy did not emerge in 1982. 
Identification of Policy Change  
 McNamara [97] argues that new ideas change the wider 
policy environment. The level of policy change depends 
upon the preceding variables, but is also central to determin-
ing if there has been a critical juncture. We hypothesise that 
once there is political entrepreneur led consolidation around 
a new set of ideas policy change should follow. We argue 
that ideational change constitutes the “differentiating factor” 
between crises that result in radical policy change, and those 
that do not. Therefore, we must discover if radical changes in 
economic policy follow ideational change. The observable 
implications used here are based upon Hall’s [21] concepts 
of first, second, and third order policy change. Hall [21: p. 
291] argued that exogenous shocks, and policy failures, dis-
credit the old paradigm, leading a re-examination of the be-
lief systems through which that policy was created – a para-
digmatic change. He describes rare, but radical, and over-
arching changes in policy as third order changes. The ob-
servables set out below enable us identify, and differentiate, 
the normal and fundamental shifts in macroeconomic policy. 
They also incorporate the idea of swift and enduring change 
[9].  
O1. If economic policy instrument settings changed 
(swiftly and for longer than one government’s term of office) 
there may have been a radical change in government 
economic policy.  
O2. If the instruments of economic policy changed 
(swiftly and for longer than one government’s term of office) 
there may have been a radical change in government 
economic policy.  
O3. If the hierarchy of goals behind economic policy 
changed (swiftly and for longer than one government’s term 
of office) then there may have been a radical change in 
government economic policy.  
Change in Mexican Macroeconomic Policy  
 The first policy response to the crisis came from the 
Portillo administration. It sought to ensure that financial pol-
icy would keep domestic interest rates competitive [120: p. 
112], while incentives were created for exports. For decades 
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free trade was ‘the policy option that dare not speak its 
name’ [78: p. 370].  
 In his inaugural address in December 1982 De La Madrid 
declared “we are in an emergency” [57]. He outlined a ten-
point austerity program – Programa Inmediato de Reor-
denacion Economica (Program of Immediate Economic Re-
organization) [121: p. 29]. He adopted a crisis management 
approach, sending a draconian budget to Congress for a 50 
percent reduction in the deficit [57]. The budgets of 1982-
1984 represented a sustained attempt at austerity [53: p. 
117].  
 De La Madrid pegged the peso at a more "realistic" 
exchange rate and introduced plans to restructure the federal 
bureaucracy. He set about implementing conventional 
monetary and fiscal austerity, more extensive trade 
liberalisation, and a less confrontational approach to the IMF 
[43: p. 63]. The IMF Managing Director, Jacques De 
Larosiere, and the Mexican finance minister, Silva-Herzog, 
negotiated an adjustment program to restore the economy. 
‘Acceptance of the IMF embrace is a major break-through’ 
[122: p. 1720], as it permitted Mexico avoid the dangers of a 
debt moratorium [120: p. 121]. 
 De La Madrid recognised that his administration could 
not rely on oil’s exports [68]. Hernandez [38] argues that the 
solution to financing the country’s development was sought 
through privatising public enterprises, of which 1,155 were 
sold off. De La Madrid sought to combine macroeconomic 
stabilisation and structural change, with a focus on export 
orientated manufacturing [53: p. 110]. This was part of the 
overall objective of integrating Mexico into the world econ-
omy. De La Madrid disbursed power to the states, to foster 
increased competitiveness within the country, and support 
private industry and investment [123]. 
 The initial adjustment package sought to ameliorate the 
external debt through a reduction of government spending 
and a one-time devaluation of the peso. This enabled Mexico 
reach its IMF targets for reducing the public sector deficit 
and limiting new public sector external indebtedness. 
Unfortunately, the recessionary impact of this strategy was 
more severe than anticipated, and much of the task of 
economic adjustment was left to De La Madrid's successor 
[116: p. 421]. 
 The ideas underlying state-led development, based on 
import substitution industrialisation collapsed. The 
government ‘embraced an approach generally oriented 
toward liberalisation, privatisation and deregulation’ [116: p. 
421]. As an interviewee stated – the change from stabilising 
development to neo-liberalism was radical. 
 These policies were to have an impact upon Mexico’s 
future economic, and social, development [53: p. 84]. 
Mexico’s import substitution policies had been centred on 
encouraging the internal market, while the new approach 
focused on using international forces as promoters of 
liberalisation [124]. However, a major concern was 
Mexico’s inability to compete in foreign markets, and its 
inadequate level of internal saving to finance growth [125]. 
De La Madrid’s administration signalled its desire to attract 
new foreign investment by offering to relax restrictive FDI 
laws. In February, 1984, the government issued guidelines 
specifying new conditions under which officials could 
authorize majority foreign ownership of firms [53: p. 115]. 
Tournaud [44] stated that once this occurred Mexican 
businesses began forging relationships with foreign firms. 
 According to Middlebrook [124] the relationship 
between the private sector and the state transformed. The 
neoliberal reforms made the private sector a key player in 
reviving the economy. According to Hernandez [38] and 
Tournaud [44] this was the main difference between De La 
Madrid’s administration and those of his predecessors. 
Business organisations became more actively engaged in 
public debates over economic policy. For decades the private 
sector had been kept at a distance by the PRI [97: p. 371]. 
 De La Madrid’s approach focused on development with a 
social objective, but based on economic reality [125]. 
According to Foucras [126] under De La Madrid all sections 
of society gained a voice. Cárdenas [109] argues that this 
would become an important factor in the movement of 
national liberalisation started in the early 1980s, and strongly 
embraced during De La Madrid’s presidency. For Rubio [40] 
and Hernandez [38], political reform changed the country’s 
social ideology. 
 Serra-Puche [39] and Cárdenas [109] argue that Mexican 
economic history can be divided into before, and after, 1982. 
Mexico started down a different path under De La Madrid 
(1982-1988). The crisis saw the development of a new set of 
policies. In the wake of crisis, and change in the ideas 
underlying economic policy, Mexico experienced a third-
order macroeconomic policy change. The market replaced 
regulation, private ownership replaced public ownership, and 
competition replaced protection [127: p. 85; 116: p. 421]. 
According to Hernandez [38] and Foucras [126], there was a 
change in Mexico’s economic model, which culminated in 
its accession to the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) in 1993.  
Change in Swedish Macroeconomic Policy  
 The recession of the 1970s saw the Swedish budget defi-
cits supporting the social welfare system deepen. By 1981 
the non-socialist coalition government was only a minority 
administration in the Riksdag [117]. Not surprisingly, the 
Swedish Employers’ Federation (SAF) was unhappy with 
the government over the state of the economy. However, the 
non-socialist government displayed great indecisiveness in 
relation to dealing with the economic malaise [80].  
 The only tangible result of the change of government in 
Sweden in 1982 was an altered approach to economic man-
agement, with only minor changes in extant economic poli-
cies. The new SAP government, admitting there were no 
ready solutions to the economy’s problems [85], imple-
mented a recovery programme – The Third Road. This ap-
proach argued that renewed growth required redistribution of 
income from labour to capital. It constituted a shift in SAP 
economic planning, behind which course lay the influence of 
its own research unit, as opposed to those of the unions. This 
marked an attempt to maintain a level of social democracy, 
which other countries were rolling back [128, p. 134]. The 
Third Road sought to devise a wide-ranging stabilisation 
programme that included demand management measures, as 
well as initiatives to promote structural change and ensure 
the fair distribution of the burden of adjustment [91: p. 21].  
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 The SAP was also determined to pour funds into job cre-
ating industries, and even to increase taxes for that purpose 
[129]. The party planned to spend $100 million, and hoped 
to attract an addition $350 million in private investment, in 
order to create 30,000 new jobs [129]. The centrepiece of 
Finance Minister Feldt’s strategy to boost corporate profits 
was devaluation of the krona. This measure was imple-
mented, in conjunction with a price freeze and increases in 
sales and corporate taxes, in a sweeping “crisis plan” aimed 
at stimulating the economy and correcting the fundamental 
imbalances therein [130, 131]. According to the OECD [91, 
p. 21] the objective was to achieve export-led, investment 
driven, recovery. The SAP had identified labour costs as the 
key to international competition. The country’s largest peak 
trade union organization, the Landsorganisationen i Sverige 
(LO) accommodated devaluation by demanding average 
wage increases of only 2.5 percent in ensuing wage bargain-
ing. However, the devaluation drew international oppro-
brium. “The danger of a chain reaction of beggar-thy-
neighbour policies with potentially disastrous consequences 
is now greater that at any time since World War II,” said 
Emil Van Lennep, secretary general of the OECD [132: p. 
3]. The devaluation and international economic recovery 
resulted in high earnings and excellent scope for export 
expansion [133: p. 333]. 
 The government also restored welfare entitlements cut by 
the non-socialists [91: p. 23]. To maintain the welfare state 
by whatever means necessary the government gave priority 
to private sector growth, profits and market forces. It intro-
duced a series of structural reforms that could be regarded as 
redefining the traditional priorities of the SAP. Under pres-
sure for more individual freedom, and the internationalisa-
tion of the economy, these reforms saw the SAP move in a 
neo-liberal direction by the late 1980s [134]. Fiscal policy 
was held tight, and the slimming of the public sector would, 
it was argued, create crowding in effects [135: p. 349]. The 
public sector austerity strategy, with a profit explosion and 
wage restraint, was to create severe tension between the SAP 
and its traditions ally the LO. Thus, in this case, the eco-
nomic policy instrument settings changed, but the instru-
ments of economic policy, and the goals behind it, remained 
much the same: maintenance of the welfare state. This con-
stituted a first-order policy change.  
 The economic crisis in Sweden generated significant de-
bate and a form of ideational collapse occurred. However, 
change agents did not consolidated around a replacement 
economic orthodoxy. As a result, the extant economic para-
digm endured, providing the existing economic policies with 
sufficient protection to remain largely intact despite the criti-
cisms. There was no critical juncture in economic policy in 
Sweden in 1982. 
 From Table 3 we can see that in the case of Mexico, the 
macroeconomic policy instruments settings, instruments, and 
hierarchy of goals behind macroeconomic policy, all 
changed. This third order policy change occurred following 
an economic crisis, the collapse of the dominant economic 
orthodoxies, the introduction of new economic ideas into the 
policy arena, and the consolidation of change agents around 
these new ideas. Together, these three factors combined, 
crisis, ideational change, and radical policy change, consti-
tuted a critical juncture in Mexican macroeconomic policy. 
 From Table 3 we can also see that in the case of Sweden 
there was no critical juncture in macroeconomic policy. Al-
though there was an economic crisis, and ideational collapse 
occurred, change agents did not consolidate around a new 
site of ideas with which to manage the Swedish economy. As 
a consequence, the old orthodoxy on how to manage the 
economy endured. The result was that the hierarchy of goals 
behind Swedish economic policy continued on despite the 
economy being in crisis.  
CONCLUSION 
 We found a critical juncture in Mexican macroeconomic 
policy in 1982. In the midst of an economic crisis calling 
into question the economic viability of the state, economic 
polices, having been undermined by previous failures, were 
overcome by change agents, led by a political entrepreneur, 
consolidating around a new set of ideas on how to manage 
the economy. The ideational foundations of extant policy 
collapsed in 1982 in the midst of the crisis. Import substitu-
tion and the restrictions imposed upon FDI were perceived 
as failing strategies. In this context, De La Madrid assumed 
the role of political entrepreneur, fostering an alternative set 
of ideas on how to manage the economy. Around these ideas 
change agents consolidated. These ideas involved a reversal 
previous policy – opening the economy to free trade and 
pursuing FDI. De La Madrid altered the setting, instruments, 
and hierarchy of goals behind Mexican economic policy – a 
third order policy change. Thus, there was a crisis, ideational 
change, and radical change in macroeconomic policy in 
Mexico, what the framework rates as a critical juncture in 
macroeconomic policy.  
 In the case of Sweden there was no critical juncture in 
macroeconomic policy in 1982. Although the economy was 
in crisis, and this was undermining confidence in the eco-
nomic orthodoxy that had dominated society for the preced-
ing half century, neither the non-socialist parties, or their 
SAP rivals, were willing to challenge this orthodoxy. Thus, 
although ideational collapse occurred during the crisis, a 
political entrepreneur willing to champion a new set of ideas 
on how to manage the Swedish economy failed to emerge. 
The result was that without such a figure, change agents, and 
Table 3. The Identification of Change in Government Policy 
The Observable Implications Mex Sw 
O1. If economic policy instrument settings changed there may have been a radical change in economic policy  X X 
O2. If the instruments of economic policy changed there may have been radical change in economic policy  X  
O3. If the hierarchy of goals behind economic policy changed there may have been a radical change in economic policy X  
Radical Change in Privatization Policy  Y N 
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any alternative ideas, were left floundering. Extant economic 
policy went largely unchallenged as no alternatives were put 
forward. There was only a first order policy change in Swe-
den at the time – a change to existing policy instrument set-
ting. Thus, although there was a crisis, and ideational col-
lapse, no new idea was consolidated, meaning there was no 
ideational change. The result of this was that economic pol-
icy changed only slightly - thus there no critical juncture in 
Swedish macroeconomic policy at this time.  
 These findings show that a critical juncture in  
macroeconomic policy consists of three stages: macro-
economic crisis, ideational change, and radical policy 
change. A macroeconomic crisis is a necessary, but, in itself, 
insufficient, condition for a paradigm shift in  
macroeconomic policy to occur. A macroeconomic crisis not 
followed by ideational change, will not lead to a radical 
change in macroeconomic policy - Sweden 1982. However, 
a macroeconomic crisis followed by ideational change  
(collapse of the extant orthodoxy and consolidation of a  
new orthodoxy) will lead to a third order change in  
macroeconomic policy, which combined constitutes a critical 
juncture – Mexico 1982.  
 Thus, ideational change was very important in determin-
ing if third order macroeconomic policy change occurred in 
the wake of the macroeconomic crises in Mexico and Swe-
den. Extant ideational orthodoxy protected existing policy, 
ensuring its continuity. However, in the wake of the macro-
economic crises, ideational collapse occurred in both coun-
tries. Existing macroeconomic policies in both countries 
were no longer protected, as their underlying ideas had been 
undermined by failure. In Mexico change agents, led by a 
political entrepreneur, consolidate around a new set of eco-
nomic ideas, and injected these into the policy domain. The 
result was a third order change in macroeconomic policy. 
However, in Sweden change agents failed to consolidate 
around a new economic orthodoxy, and existing ideas en-
dured. As a result there was only a first order policy change 
in Sweden. Political entrepreneur led consolidation around a 
new set of economic ideas was the difference between an 
economic crisis that lead to a critical juncture in macroeco-
nomic policy (Mexico), and one that did not (Sweden). This 
ties in with the argument that different network configura-
tions are associated with different orders of policy change 
[136: p. 771]. 
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APPENDIX A 
Mexico’s Economic Indicators, 1972 – 1982 
Year Unemply  
(%) 
Inflation  
(%) 
Government Debt to 
GNP ratio 
Growth Rates in Real 
GDP 
Gross Capital  
Formation % of GDP 
1972 7 5 18.5 8.22 20.32 
1973 7.3 12.04 19.31 7.86 21.39 
1974 7.2 23.75 19.73 5.78 23.18 
1975 7.2 15.15 21.17 5.74 23.69 
1976 6.7 15.79 27.62 4.42 22.29 
1977 8.8 29 39.18 3.38 22.84 
1978 6.9 17.45 35.86 8.96 23.6 
1979 5.7 18.17 32.79 9.69 25.95 
1980 4.2 26.36 30.53 9.22 25.73 
1981 4.2 27.93 32.59 8.77 25.94 
1982 6.8 58.92 53.3 -0.63 21.56 
1983 6.9 101.7 66.53 -4.2 19.77 
Source: Data Gob. [WWW document]. URL http://www.iadb.org/DataGob/index.html; Mitchell, R. B. (2007) International Historical Statistics: The Americas 1750-2005. 6th ed. 
Macmillan: Basingstoke; Fleck, S. And Sorrentino, C. (1994) ‘Employment and Unemployment in Mexico’s Labour force’. Monthly Labour Review, November (3). 
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APPENDIX B 
Sweden’s Economic Indicators, 1972 – 1982  
Year Unemply 
(%) 
Inflation 
(%) 
Government Debt to 
GNP ratio 
Growth Rates in Real 
GDP 
Gross Capital  
Formation % of GDP 
1972 2.0 6.0 22.2 2.2 23.45 
1973 2.5 6.7 22.6 3.9 22.65 
1974 2.0 9.9 24.2 4.3 25.27 
1975 1.6 9.8 24.4 2.2 25.71 
1976 1.6 10.3 23.6 1.2 24.90 
1977 1.8 11.4 26.5 -2.0 21.68 
1978 2.2 10.0 31.8 1.3 18.69 
1979 2.1 7.2 37.9 4.3 21.22 
1980 2.0 13.7 43.2 1.9 22.60 
1981 2.5 12.1 50.8 -0.6 19.61 
1982 3.1 8.6 59.3 1.1 19.29 
1983 3.5 9.0 64.6 1.8 19.02 
Source: Data Gob. [WWW document]. URL http://www.iadb.org/DataGob/index.html; OECD, 1995. Labour Force Statistics. OECD: Paris; Statistical Annex of European Economy, 
Spring 2003; Eurostat Yearbook 1997. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities; Mitchell, B. R., 1993. International Historical Statistics. Europe 
1750-1988. (3rd ed.) Hong Kong: Stockton Press; Alan Heston, Robert Summers and Bettina Aten, Penn World Table Version 6.1, Center for International Comparisons at the Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania (CICUP), October 2002. 
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